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We investigate the effects of IMF stabilization programs, and the reasons behind the unusually 
high IMF activity and relatively low program completion rates in Latin America. We base our 
tests on a panel, and distinguish between IMF program approvals and completion. We find that 
Latin America has higher output costs of IMF programs (especially when completed), no 
improvement in the current account, and a much higher likelihood of program failure and 
recidivism than other regions. The common finding that entering into an IMF-supported program 
incurs real short-run costs on the economy is entirely driven by the experiences in Latin 
America. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Latin America is a volatile region with a history of exceptionally high inflation rates, substantial 
macroeconomic instability, and a record of unsuccessful monetary and fiscal stabilizations. Not surprisingly, 
the credibility of stabilization efforts with the public is low, making the task of successfully implementing 
new stabilization programs very difficult. Latin American countries are also the most frequent users of IMF 
loans and associated IMF-supported stabilization programs (Table 1). These programs’ primary official 
objective is to restore balance of payments equilibrium and, in this context, IMF loans are granted (and the 
funds disbursed incrementally) conditional upon specific macroeconomic and other criteria being met.
1 
This study investigates the macroeconomic effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs in Latin 
America, relative to other parts of the world, focusing in particular on output growth and balance of payments 
adjustment. We also consider the reasons behind the unusually high IMF program activity in Latin America, 
relatively low program completion rates, and how these characteristics may be associated with 
macroeconomic instability and the history of failed macroeconomic stabilizations in the region. 
There is considerable debate over the effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs but no consensus 
has emerged about the macroeconomic impact of these programs.
2 Most empirical studies using panel data 
sets and regression techniques find that IMF-supported programs improve the balance of payments and the 
current account, but views on the ultimate output and employment effects are much more divergent.
3 Studies 
measuring the output costs of IMF-program participation have reached radically different conclusions—with 
estimates ranging from sizeable declines in output growth (e.g. Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000), to little or no 
adverse output effects (Hutchison, 2002 and 2003), to quite strong positive output effects (e.g. Edwards and 
Santaella, 1993; Dicks-Mireaux et al., 2000).
4  
To our knowledge, no study has specifically focused on the output and current account effects of IMF-
supported programs for Latin America over the past two decades. In an early unique contribution, Pastor 
(1987) considered IMF programs in Latin America in 1960-1981 (using developments before/after program 
participation, as well as differences between years when countries were in and out of programs, as the 
                                                 
1  A key purpose of the IMF is “…to give confidence to members by making the Fund’s resources temporarily available 
to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their 
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity” (IMF Articles of 
Agreement, Article I (v)). 
2  There is a large literature reviewing the effects of IMF-supported stabilization programs. See, for example, Beveridge 
and Kelly (1980), Bordo and James (2000), Connors (1979), Conway (2000), Edwards (1989), Gylafson (1987), 
Hutchison (2002, 2003), and Pastor (1987).  
3  For a survey of these results, see Ul Haque and Khan (1998). 
4  These conflicting results arise from several sources, including differences in the types of IMF programs that are 
investigated; differences in the groups of countries or the time periods that are investigated (e.g. poor developing 
versus emerging market economies or pre- and post- Bretton Woods); differences in the methodologies that are 
employed; and, perhaps most important, how other factors influencing output growth are taken into account. See 
Hutchison (2003) for a detailed discussion.    2 
benchmarks), and concluded that the current account and output effects of programs were inconclusive. He 
found, however, systematic reductions in the labor share of income following IMF programs.
5  
The absence of recent work in this area is surprising, since Latin America is the region of the world where 
the IMF has been most active and macroeconomic volatility greatest. To address this gap in the literature, this 
study addresses five main questions. First, does participation in an IMF-supported stabilization program tend 
to make real GDP growth weaker? Second, what is the average impact of an IMF program on balance of 
payments adjustment? Third, does there appear to be differential effects of IMF programs in Latin America 
compared with the rest of world? Fourth, are there differences in the macroeconomic outcomes between 
countries that fully complete IMF programs, never withdraw funds (using the IMF program as a 
“precautionary” contingent source of funds) and those that have programs approved but are not fully 
completed? Fifth, does the poor completion record of IMF programs in Latin America affect their 
macroeconomic performance during program participation? 
In addition to our focus on Latin America, we introduce several methodological innovations. The 
estimation methodology employed to investigate real growth effects of IMF programs is the standard General 
Evaluation Estimator (GEE). However, we introduce a “matching” procedure into the analysis to control for 
selection bias (countries self-select into IMF program participation), and argue that Heckman’s (1979) Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR) statistic does not appear to adequately address this point. We also control for the 
occurrence of recent currency/balance of payments crises and “sudden stops” in capital flows associated with 
currency crises, and test for interaction effects between these events and subsequent participation in IMF 
programs. This allows us to answer the question: Is the adverse output effect of a currency crisis and/or a 
reversal in capital flows in Latin America made worse when the IMF steps in with a stabilization package? 
Another innovation is that we distinguish between IMF program approvals and successful completion of IMF 
programs in measuring macroeconomic effects. This is especially important for Latin America since the 
majority of programs are not successfully completed. Our econometric tests are based on panel data set (67 
countries over the 1975–97 period) with country-specific effects. 
Section 2 presents a short description of IMF programs and statistics on the number and completion rates 
of programs in Latin America and elsewhere. We also discuss the frequency that Latin American countries 
enter into new programs (recidivism). Section 3 discusses the methodology and data. Section 4 reports the 
primary empirical results of the study. This section presents estimation results of the “reduced form” output 
                                                 
5  In particular, Pastor (1987) considers 18 Latin American countries over the 1965–81 period. He measures the (1) 
“before” and “during” absolute comparisons of key macroeconomic variables and (2) the relative performance of 
countries participating in IMF program and those that were not. He finds that IMF programs during 1960-81 were 
associated with insignificant changes in the current account, significant improvements in the balance of payments and 
mixed effects on output growth. His key result is that IMF programs appeared to be strongly related to a reduction in 
the labor share of income.  
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and current account equations with explanatory variables that include currency crises and IMF program 
participation. Section 5 interprets the main results of the study against the background of the recent literature 
on macroeconomic instability, the link between failed stabilizations and lack of policy credibility, and the 
determinants of IMF program completion and recidivism. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The IMF in Latin America 
2.1 IMF Stabilization Programs  
The main IMF facilities designed to meet short-run balance of payments stabilization are Stand-By 
Arrangements (SBA) and the Enhanced Fund Facility (EFF).
6 In general, Fund members can access credit 
tranches from the General Resources Account (GRA) either by means of IMF program arrangements or by 
means of “outright purchases.” Outright purchases are limited, typically, for the first 25% of the member’s 
quota and do not involve any phasing or conditionality. Stand-by arrangements have been the main instrument 
through which members gain access to further credit tranches.
7 Stand By Arrangements (SBA) typically last 
for 12–18 months. Any drawings beyond the first tranche require both phasing out and stricter conditionality 
and are limited to 100% of quota annually (300% cumulativel y together with the Extended Fund Facility, 
EFF, as discussed below). Repurchase obligations last 3¼–5 years from the date of purchase.  
The Extended Fund Facility, established in 1974, provides somewhat longer-term financing to countries 
in need of structural economic reforms. EFF arrangements typically last for 3 years; phasing and 
conditionality are similar to the SBAs with an emphasis on longer-term structural reforms. Quota limits are 
identical to the SBAs while repurchases last much longer (4½–10 years). Both facilities are subject to the 
same rate of interest for repayments. Countries sign an agreement with the IMF before participating in a 
program that sets certain conditions (“conditionality”)—most frequently specific targets for macroeconomic 
policy—designed to help restore balance of payments equilibria and insure repayment to the Fund. These 
conditions, typically involving tight monetary/credit policy and budget deficit reduction, are controversial 
(e.g. Stiglitz, 2000). 
We use the SBA and EFF programs (and, for Korea in 1997, the new SRF program) as our definition of 
“IMF-supported stabilization programs.” These are the only programs clearly linked to short-term balance of 
payments adjustment.
8 By contrast with these programs, some Fund facilities are designed with other 
                                                 
6  See Hutchison (2003) for an extended discussion of IMF programs and conditionality.  
7  As the Articles of Agreement state, they were defined as “a decision by the Fund by which a member is assured that it 
will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance with the terms of the decision 
during a specified period and up to a specified amount” (Article XXX (b)). 
8  There are no cases of SBA and EFF programs being approved in the same year in our data sample.   4 
objectives in mind (e.g. Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility). We do not include these programs since 
their primary objective is not short-run balance-of-payments stabilization.
9 
The regional distribution and types of IMF programs are shown in Table 1. Throughout the IMF’s history 
(and up to 1999), 817 short-term and 100 long-term programs were initiated and approved (long-term 
programs only began in the late 1980s).
10 Short-term stabilization programs are primarily directed to Latin 
America, with about 38 percent of program approvals.
11  
 
2.2 Completion Rates and Recidivism 
Table 1 also shows that Latin America is the region with the highest number of programs per country over 
the 1952–1999 period. (This table includes all IMF programs). In particular, Latin America had 11.7 
programs per country compared to the world average of 6.8 programs per country.
12  
In the Latin American context, the high rate of recidivism—i.e., repeated agreements with the IMF—may 
be related to the low rate of program completion in the region. Table 2 shows the completion rates of IMF 
programs for all countries compared with Latin American countries. Our definition of completion is the 
percentage of IMF funds approved for the program that were actually disbursed. This measure does not 
necessarily constitute a measure of successful implementation of a program, as it might be the case that 
resources are not disbursed because the underlying reason for the program is no longer there. It short, it might 
be the case that the program proved to be so successful or that other positive shocks that occurred made 
continuation of the program unnecessary. Moreover, a number of approved IMF programs have never seen 
funds withdrawn, typically because these were originally intended as a “precautionary” source of funds (a 
contingent credit line).
13  
                                                 
9  In contrast with our study, Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000) focus on the structural adjustment programs in their research 
(SAF and ESAF) and measure the effects of these IMF-supported programs on poor developing countries. Bordo and 
Schwartz (2000) consider both IMF stabilization and structural adjustment programs, and use a mixed sample of 20 
emerging market and developed countries (including Australia and New Zealand). Similarly, Przeworski and Vreeland 
(2000) do not differentiate between programs, including both stabilization and structural adjustment IMF lending 
arrangements 
10 Contrary to popular perception, Hutchison (2003) finds that the number of IMF programs is not growing over time, 
nor is the size of these programs changing much relative to the size of the economies involved (about 2 percent of 
GDP in 1995–99). The size of the average program in terms of SDRs jumped in the late 1990s, however, due to the 
large economic size of the countries going to the IMF for assistance (e.g. Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Russian 
Federation, and South Korea). 
11 Not surprising, given the poverty in the region, Africa dominates the long-term structural programs with 72 percent of 
approved programs. 
12 More specifically, this statistic is the number of programs per country where the regional sample is defined as those 
countries entering into at least one IMF program.  
13 We find 75 precautionary arrangements in the 1975-1997 sample we used in our estimations. 
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We are not able to determine, from our data, which programs were stopped or partially completed due to 
the IMF (suspensions or cancellations), or whether funds were not withdrawn at the discretion of the country 
involved. In our empirical work, we consider several tests to check the robustness of our results to several 
assumptions. However, a number of reports, written both in the IMF and by others, suggest that in many cases 
the amount disbursed may be a good indicator of program success (Mussa and Savastano, 1999, Dreher, 2002, 
Bird, 2002). In an IMF working paper, for example, Ivanova et al. (2003) report that the disbursal of funds is 
correlated with other indicators of program implementation. Mussa and Savastano (1999) study 615 IMF 
arrangements and find: “In a few of these cases, the program was so successful (or conditions improved so 
rapidly) that the member needed to use only a fraction of the committed IMF financing. Mainly, however, 
these were cases where the program went off track and subsequent negotiations failed to reach agreement on a 
modified program.” (p. 94)  
The different measures of completion, shown in table 2, are all based on the percentage of IMF funds 
approved for the program that were actually disbursed. The column headings are programs completed (with 
disbursement rates of 100% or above 75%), partially completed (rates between 25% and 75%), and programs 
not implemented (with disbursement rates listed as either zero or less than 25%). Only 23% of the IMF 
programs in Latin America disbursed all of the approved funds (32% of the programs disbursed more than 
75% of the approved funds), compared with a completion rate of 35% (45%) for all IMF programs in the 
world. Similarly, 33% of IMF programs in Latin America paid out less than 25% of the approved funds—and 
27% of the programs disbursed no monies at all. The corresponding statistics for all IMF programs are much 
lower at, respectively, 24% and 18%.  
These low completion rates are also reflected in the average rate of completion (funds disbursement). On 
average, 50% of the approved funds for an IMF program in Latin America were disbursed over the 1952-1999 
period compared with an average rate of 60% for all of the IMF programs around the world. Moreover, there 
is no apparent time trend in program completion, neither in Latin America nor elsewhere.
14 
 
3.  Methodology and Data  
3.1 GEE Methodology 
Throughout our regression analysis we employ the General Evaluation Estimator (GEE) methodology that 
was first applied to the evaluation of IMF programs by Goldstein and Montiel (1986). The key element in this 
approach is that it must be possible to characterize macroeconomic policy choices by a simple and stable 
                                                 
14 This finding is different than the one presented in Mussa and Savastano (1999) and expounded on in Bird (2002) 
which did not account for the fact that the end of their sample included programs that did not yet expire. Details are 
explained in the working paper version of this paper, Table 1.1.3 (Hutchison and Noy, 2003). 
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(over time and across countries) reaction function that holds for both participating and non-participating 
country-years. We extend this standard model by introducing currency crises and sudden stops in capital 
inflows as additional factors influencing the evolution of output (for their importance see Hutchison, 2003 and 
Hutchison and Noy, 2002b). We differentiate between IMF program participation in Latin America and 
elsewhere and thus are able to identify the uniqueness of the IMF’s intervention in Latin America. 
Furthermore, we investigate whether accounting for completion (implementation) rate of IMF programs 
changes these results. 
In our model, the growth of real GDP for the ith country at time t ( it y ) is explained by policies that would 
have been observed in the absence of an IMF-supported program ( it x ); external factors ( it w ); the recent 
occurrence of financial crises (
CC
i D ) (￿ ); the existence of an IMF-supported program (
IMF
i D ) (￿ ); the existence of 
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a zero mean, fixed variance, serially uncorrelated, disturbance term.  0 b  is a vector of country effects 
(allowing average growth rates to vary across countries in the sample). 
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program periods, and a key part of the GEE estimation approach is therefore to construct a counterfactual for 
policies during programs. This counterfactual is based upon a policy reaction function that links changes in 
the policy instrument to the deviation of the observed lagged value for output growth from its desired value 
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Equation (3) is the GEE reduced-form model used in a number of earlier studies (Dicks-Mireaux et al., 
2000; Goldstein and Montiel, 1986; and Hutchison, 2003). This model is estimated using panel data drawn 
from countries and periods in which IMF support was in place and those in which IMF support was absent. 
The initial aim is to get consistent estimates for 
IMF b —the effects of IMF lending programs on the target 
variable. By including a binary variable for IMF programs in Latin America, we estimate the additional 
(marginal) effect of having an IMF program in that region (so that, overall, the effect of an IMF program in a 
Latin American country is captured by summing the two coefficients). We also investigate alternative 
definitions in classifying program-years—both years for which an IMF program was approved and years in 
which a completed (or partially completed) IMF program was in place (with the aim of identifying the 
differential effect of completing a program).
15 
 
3.2 Estimation and Matching 
In our estimates we follow a procedure first suggested by Hausman and Taylor (1981) that takes into 
account the bias in estimation of a dynamic panel with predetermined and endogenous variables. When a 
correlation exists between the independent variables and the individual country-specific effects, a least-squares 
estimation of a dynamic model ignores the correlation between the time-invariant country-fixed effects and the 
error term. Similarly, a correlation between the crises or program explanatory variables and the error term 
exists when output fluctuations contribute to their onset. The Hausman-Taylor three-step estimation 
methodology is an instrumental variable estimator that takes into account the possible correlation between the 
                                                 
15 Note that the theoretical model suggests that the change in the output growth rate is the appropriate dependent variable 
to be included in the regressions. We use this formulation of the dependent variable in our empirical specifications. 
The results (available from the authors upon request) are not materially changed if the dependent variable is the 
growth rate of output.    8 
independent variables and the individual country-specific effects. By assuming appropriate exclusion restrictions 
on the lag structure of the structural equations, simultaneity issues running from output growth (our dependent 
variable) to currency crises and IMF programs are also dealt with.
16, 17  
In the first step, least squares estimates (with fixed effects) are employed to obtain consistent but 
inefficient estimates for the variance components for the coefficients of the time-varying variables. In the 
second step, an FGLS procedure is employed to obtain variances for the time-invariant variables. The third 
step is a weighted IV estimation using deviation from means of lagged values of the time-varying variables as 
instruments.
18 The procedure requires specifying which explanatory variables are to be treated as endogenous. 
In our specification, the endogenous explanatory variables are the binary measures (IMF programs, currency 
crises and Sudden Stops) and the lagged dependent variable.
19 
A decision by the IMF to offer participation in a loan program and a decision by the borrowing country to 
accept such an offer are not random. Therefore, if the participation decision is correlated with macroeconomic 
variables that are also correlated with the outcome variable (in this case, output growth and the current 
account balance) a standard estimation of output growth will yield a biased coefficient for the participation 
variable. While instrumental variables have generally been used to deal with this type of selection bias, other 
techniques are available when no good instruments are available.
20 
The common Heckman (1979) methodology to deal with selection bias has been used before in the 
literature evaluating IMF program participation and has performed poorly (Dicks-Mireaux et al., 2000 and 
Hutchison, 2003). The more recent methodology of matching (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002 and Heckman et al., 
1997, 1998) is designed to account for the ‘selection on observables’ bias. In its purest form, the idea is 
simple. Each participation observation is matched to a non-participation observation that has the same 
observed values of a vector of other characteristics that determine participation (X). The difference in the 
observed outcome between the two matched observations is thus the program’s effect. 
Heckman et al. (1997) note that “…simple balancing of observables in the participant and comparison 
group samples goes a long way toward producing a more effective evaluation strategy” (p. 607). On this 
                                                 
16 Without appropriate, and fairly restrictive, assumptions on the structural equations, our estimation measures 
correlations rather than causality. Even so, our main result, namely that the negative output effect of an IMF program 
disappears once one includes IMF programs in Latin America separately and that no effect is discernible on the current 
account, still hold. 
17 A more efficient General Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure is theoretically possible. It relies on utilizing more 
available moment conditions to obtain a more efficient estimation (e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991 and 1998). In our 
case, the long time-series makes this procedure difficult to implement for most specifications of the model. Hutchison 
and Noy (2002a, 2002b) provide some results using the Arellano and Bond (1998) GMM framework and show that the 
coefficient estimates obtained are very similar to those obtained from the Hausman and Taylor (1981) procedure. 
18 For exact details on the motivation and estimation procedure, see Hausman and Taylor (1981) and Greene (2002) 
respectively. 
19 Different assumptions with regard to the endogenous variables do not change our results. 
20 For a survey see Blundell and Costa Días (2000).   9 
basis, we insure that our samples of program and non-program observations are distributed over a common 
support for the participation decision. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983 and 1985) have shown that, if the 
probability of participation—P(X)—is known than matching by P(X) instead of X is sufficient. This collapses 
a multidimensional problem to one dimension and greatly simplifies the procedure. Furthermore, Rubin and 
Thomas (1992) show that using an estimated probability of participation  ) ( ~ X P  instead of P(X) is still 
effective in reducing selection-on-observables bias.  
In practical terms, we start by estimating a probit model of the decision to participate in an IMF short-
term program. We employ a specification that is similar to that reported in Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000) and 
Hutchison (2003).
21 We then construct the estimated probability of participation ( ) ( ~ X P —a propensity score) 
for each country-year. We discard those observations whose propensity scores are outside the common 
support of the participating and non-participating observations.
22 This implies that 155 non-program 
observations that have very low estimated propensity scores (<0.079) and 4 participation observations that 
have the highest estimated propensity scores (>0.82) are omitted. All our econometric exercises include only 
the trimmed samples. 
 
3.3 Data 
The minimum data requirements to be included are that GDP figures are available for a minimum of 10 
consecutive years over the period 1975–97. This requirement results in a sample of 67 developing countries.
23 
We use annual observations.  
The data on IMF programs, on their time span and amounts agreed and withdrawn, was taken from 
various issues of the IMF’s Annual Report. Our binary indicator of currency crises is constructed by 
identifying “large” changes in an index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real 
exchange rate changes and monthly (percent) reserve losses.
24 Following convention (e.g. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999) the weights are inversely related to the variance of changes of each component over the 
sample for each country. An episode of severe exchange rate pressure is defined as a value in the index—a 
threshold point—that exceeds the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation, provided that it 
                                                 
21 See appendix C for results of the estimated probit equation. 
22 Edwards (2002) also uses the same propensity score—common support procedure to control for selection bias in his 
research on determinants of the current account. 
23 Our sample also excludes major oil-exporting countries and countries with a population of less than one million. For a 
complete list, see the working paper version (Hutchison and Noy, 2003). 
24 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp rises in interest rates. 
Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period in many of the developing 
countries in our dataset. 
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also exceeds 5 percent. For the algorithm we used to construct the binary Sudden Stop variable, we first 
identified observations in which there was an increase in the current account of more than 3 percent of GDP. 
We then marked a crisis year whenever a country experienced both a turnaround in the current account (a 
capital flow reversal) and a currency crisis. For exact details on the procedures used to identify currency 
crises and Sudden Stops and their justifications, see Glick and Hutchison (2001) and Hutchison and Noy 
(2002) respectively. 
In our regression analysis we include several control variables. For external-exogenous factors we include 
trade-weighted lagged external growth rates of the major trading blocks (EU, Japan and US) and the lagged 
rate of real exchange rate overvaluation.
25 The (lagged) policy factors we consider are the change in the 
budget surplus to GDP ratio, inflation, and credit growth.  
In controlling for sample selection bias, a probit equation explaining the likelihood of IMF-program 
participation was estimated. Other variables employed in this estimation, not noted above, are the rate of 
capital formation, the debt to GDP ratio, the debt service to imports ratio, and the foreign exchange to imports 
ratio. All these macroeconomic data series are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS CD-ROM. 
 
4.  Output and Current Account Effects of IMF Programs in Latin America  
4.1 Evaluating the Output Effects  
Table 3 presents results from our benchmark model.
26 The statistically significant control variables are 
lagged output growth, lagged inflation, external growth rates, real exchange rate overvaluation, and the crises 
variables. A one-percent rise in the growth rate of the G-3 economies raises output growth in developing 
economies an average of about 0.30 percentage points. Rises in inflation and in the real exchange rate 
overvaluation index significantly reduce output growth. However, the coefficients for budget changes and 
credit growth are not significantly different from zero. The signs and coefficient estimates for the control 
variables are consistent across alternative specifications of the model reported elsewhere in this paper. 
Turning to the financial crises variables, the coefficient estimates indicate that the onset of a 
contemporaneous (lagged) currency crisis is associated with a fall in GDP growth of about 1.0 (1.2) 
                                                 
25 Real exchange rate overvaluation is defined as deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade weighted exchange rate. 
The real trade-weighted exchange rate is the trade-weighted sum of the bilateral real exchange rates (defined in terms 
of CPI indices) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the Japanese yen. The trade-weights are based on the 
average bilateral trade with the United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 1990. 
26 The participation equation estimated and summary statistics are available in the working paper version of this article. 
See Hutchison and Noy (2003).   11 
percentage points with a much larger effect attributed to the occurrence of a sudden-stop (about 3.4 
percentage points).
27  
In column (1) of table 3, we observe that the average effect of an IMF short-term program on output is 
statistically significant and negative. Column (2) demonstrates that controlling for Sudden Stops does not 
change that significance level or magnitude of the negative “IMF effect.” However, once we control for the 
difference between IMF programs in Latin America and elsewhere (column 3)—with or without controlling 
for the occurrence of sudden stop crises (column 4)—the result no longer holds. Specifically, the coefficient 
for the IMF program approval dummy in columns (3)–(4) is no longer significantly different from zero.  
The results reported in columns (3)–(4) indicate, however, that a program approval in Latin America will 
lead to a statistically significant average reduction of output growth of 1.1–1.5 percentage points. The effect 
of IMF program approvals in Latin America appears to be worse than elsewhere.
28  
However, it is not clear whether IMF programs in Latin American have “underperformed” relative to the 
other regions during each decade of our sample. To investigate this issue for the 1990s, compared to earlier 
decades, column (5) presents results of IMF programs with a decomposition of programs during 1990–97. 
Two dummy variables are added to our baseline model: a dummy variable representing all IMF program 
years during 1990–97 (one if in program year, zero otherwise) and a dummy variables for Latin American 
program years during 1990–97 (one if in program year, zero otherwise). The “output effect” results for Latin 
American programs are again highly significant (negative) over the entire sample, but substantially larger on 
average (-2.32) than previously reported in columns (3) and (4). (The output effect of IMF programs for all 
regions, during the entire sample period or during the 1990s, remains statistically insignificant). The converse 
is true for the 1990s, however, as estimated output effect of an IMF program in Latin America during the 
1990–97 period is positive (3.15) and highly significant relative to the sample average; the marginal net effect 
of a program in Latin America in the 1990s is positive (0.83=3.15–2.32) and marginally significant. This 
indicates that IMF programs in Latin America are associated with very small positive output effects in the 
1990s, but large negative effects during 1975-89.  
 
                                                 
27 Hutchison and Noy (2002b) find that Sudden Stops are even more traumatic for a sample of higher income emerging 
market economies. 
28 This result is maintained, qualitatively, for the more restricted sub-sample of Latin American countries, but 
coefficients are no longer statistically significant. We also test for longer run effects of IMF programs by adding 2 or 3 
lags of the IMF dummy and the IMF Latin America dummy variable. None of these lag values are statistically 
significant, however. 
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4.2 Evaluating the Output Effects of Completed IMF Programs 
Table 4 examines whether the identified magnitudes of the output effects are different once completion of 
IMF programs is considered. In this table we employ several different variables to proxy for completed (or 
partially completed) programs. In the first, we construct an index that is the ratio of disbursed resources to the 
amount agreed in the original program.
29 Secondly, we construct a binary variable that marks 1 for every 
program that was completed on time, and for which all resources were disbursed, and 0 otherwise. Another 
version of this binary measure identifies completed programs as ones in which at least 75% of agreed 
resources were disbursed. Thirdly, we identify those programs that were intended as precautionary 
arrangements—those programs for which no monies were disbursed—and use an alternative definition of 
program participation (approval) that includes only non-precautionary programs.  
The general specification of our reduced form model remains the same and very similar 
coefficients for the control variables are obtained. The lagged growth rate, the inflation rate and the 
external variables are still statistically significant and have plausible signs.  
When the completion index (ratio) is employed to account for completion of programs, the average effect 
of an IMF program is found to be positive (but only occasionally statistically significant) while IMF programs 
in Latin America decrease output growth by 1.8 percentage points for each program year (column 1).
30 
Results are similar for either of the two versions of the completed-programs binary variable employed 
(columns 2–3). A completed IMF program has a positive but statistically indistinguishable effect on output 
while a completed IMF program in Latin America reduces output by 1.9 percentage points for our index=1 
binary measure and 0.9 percentage points for our index>0.75 binary variable (the coefficients are statistically 
significant).
31  
Finally, we identify those IMF programs for which at least the first tranche of funds were drawn, i.e. we 
exclude those programs that were intended to “precautionary.”
32 Seventy-five programs in our sample fall into 
this category. The empirical results are very similar, however. For column 4 in table 4, the coefficient 
estimate for the IMF variable (-0.87) is very similar to that reported in table 3 column 2 (-0.73), which uses 
the more inclusive definition of IMF programs. The IMF coefficient estimates reported in column 5 of table 4 
are also very similar to those reported in column 4 of table 3. Throughout the robustness exercises, two results 
                                                 
29 For justification of using this index see section 2 and for statistics on the index see table 2. 
30 These results are obtained by summing the coefficients for the IMF and Latin American IMF binary variables. 
31 Boughton (2000) suggests that the nature of IMF programs changed dramatically with the debt crisis of the 1980s. To 
examine the robustness of our result, we ran the same specification as in table 4 column 2 for the sample later than 
1982 and obtained a very similar coefficient on the Latin American IMF variable (3.4 percentage points). We also 
examined whether accounting for the magnitude of the sudden stop in capital inflows changes our results—it does not, 
the IMF coefficient for the same column 2 is then 3.3 percentage points. 
32 Programs abruptly cancelled before any funds were disbursed would also not be included in this group.    13 
stand out: IMF programs in Latin America are more costly if they are completed and evidently costlier than 
elsewhere. 
 
4.3 Evaluating the Effect of IMF programs on the Balance of Payments 
In table 5, we adopt a variant of the specification of Calderón et al. (2002) to estimate the determinants of 
the current account deficit. We can thus examine whether any correlation is observable in the data between 
participation in a short-term IMF program and the level of the current account surplus as percent of GDP. As 
suggested in their work, our control variables are a lagged current account surplus to GDP ratio, a change in 
budget surplus, real GDP growth, debt to GDP ratio, external trade-weighted growth rates, and real exchange 
rate overvaluation.  
All of the coefficients have the anticipated signs and are statistically significant. The model explains up to 
56% of the variation in the current account over time and across countries. Column (1) examines the average 
effect of an IMF program approval on the current account. These results correspond to previous studies: IMF 
programs have little contemporaneous effect on the current account but a significant positive effect with a 
one-year lag. By contrast, the effect of an IMF program in Latin America is significantly positive 
contemporaneously but significantly negative with a one-year lag (with little cumulative effect on the current 
account).  
We also examine whether our results are due to omitted variable bias. Specifically, it might be the case 
that the estimated improvement in the current account is due to a change in the real exchange rate (and drastic 
devaluation of the exchange rate, i.e., a currency crisis) rather than the introduction of an IMF program. 
Indeed, it appears that this is the case. Column (2) includes only the general IMF approval dummies while 
column (3) asks whether that effect is different, on average, for Latin American countries. Columns (4) and 
(5) employ the same specification to examine whether completed programs differ in their effects with those 
programs that were approved but never implemented. In these specifications we use the completion variables 
discussed in the previous section. In all of these regressions that include an accounting of currency crises, the 
coefficients for the IMF variables are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The standard result in the 
literature—the positive effect of an IMF program in facilitating current account adjustment—does not appear 
to hold when the sharp currency depreciations often preceding IMF programs (currency crises) are taken into 
account.  
 
5.  Instability, failed stabilizations and IMF programs in Latin America 
IMF program failures/cancellations are more frequent in Latin America and the output costs of 
completing a program, when it does occur, are substantially higher than in other regions. Previous studies   14 
finding adverse effects of IMF programs may be entirely explained by the poor performance of Latin 
American countries when they enter into an IMF-sponsored stabilization program. Further, there is little 
evidence of substantial improvement in the current account when entering into an IMF program once the 
effects of sharp currency depreciations preceding program approvals are taken into account.  
Four related and self-reinforcing factors appear to explain this poor performance: external shocks 
combined with poor institutions, a history of poor macroeconomic management, the lack of policy credibility, 
and the nature of IMF-sponsored stabilizations. This argument is spelled out in more detail, together with 
references to the appropriate literature, in the remainder of this section and in our concluding comments.  
 
5.1 Volatility and Failed Stabilizations in Latin America 
Latin America is a very volatile region with exceptionally high inflation rates, substantial macroeconomic 
instability, and a history of failed monetary and fiscal stabilizations that has eroded credibility in policy 
reforms generally. Hausmann and Gavin (1996) show that inflation in Latin America is more than 100 times 
as volatile (measured in standard deviations) as in the industrial countries and higher by far than in any other 
region of the world; real GDP growth in Latin America is about two to three times as volatile as industrial 
countries, and more volatile than in any region other than Africa and the Middle East; and while a “typical” 
recession lasts roughly two years both in Latin America and in other regions, it involves an output decline in 
real GDP of about 8 percent in Latin America compared to only about 2 percent in industrial economies. 
They attribute the relatively high volatility of inflation and output in Latin America to especially large 
external shocks—mainly terms of trade disturbances and sudden shifts in international capital flows—as well 
as unstable macroeconomic policy.
33 These shocks, combined with “institutions and policy regimes [that] 
have been ill-equipped to cope with large shocks,” are important in making Latin America a volatile region 
(p. 2). Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001) also point to especially unfavourable external conditions facing 
Latin America in explaining low growth in the region.
34  
Linked with macroeconomic instability, most Latin American experiences with stabilization reforms have 
been disappointing. Rigobón (2002) finds that most attempts at fiscal reforms in eight Latin American 
countries in the last 30 years have not been completed (22 of 30 experiences), with key parts of the reforms 
not implemented and the programs eventually abandoned. He shows that a typical experience in Latin 
America is for a country to start a disinflation program when there is a problem with high inflation and a 
fiscal deficit, a nominal anchor is implemented and a fiscal reform started. The fiscal reform usually takes 
                                                 
33 Hausmann and Gavin (1996) argue that terms of trade volatility, as well as its affect on the macro economy, is greater 
in Latin America because of the high concentration of the region’s exports in primary commodities.  
34 Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996) present evidence that the pro-cyclical fiscal response in recessions in Latin 
America is an important contributing factor to macroeconomic instability.   15 
longer than anticipated, however, and budget deficits are slow to decline. Ultimately, both the nominal anchor 
and fiscal reform are abandoned and higher inflation returns. 
Tornell and Velasco (1998) consider the major successful stabilization programs in Latin America since 
1960 (22 cases), contrasting the consequences for fiscal discipline from “exchange rate-based” and “money-
based” programs. They find that money-based programs induced substantially more fiscal discipline, and 
show theoretically that this stylised fact is consistent with a model whereby a money-based stabilization 
program provides more discipline, and is more effective, in cases where the policy maker is impatient.  
In a model that includes price controls and government credibility, van Wijnbergen (1988) investigates 
the high costs associated with disinflation programs in Brazil and Argentina. He shows that the interaction 
between lack of credibility of government monetary policy announcements and the price setting behavior of 
forward looking firms can lead to inertia well beyond the price setting period. Furthermore, the lack of 
government credibility leads to substantial output losses during the disinflation program.  
Against a background of macroeconomic instability and a history of failed stabilizations, it is not 
surprising that policymakers lack credibility and that each new stabilization effort is associated with 
substantial output costs. When agents expect policy reforms to fail with a high probability, private sector 
adjustment is slow and tentative and leads to higher adjustment costs. 
  
5.2 Explaining Recidivism and Low Program Completion Rates 
There is now a substantial literature on the degree of “recidivism,” duration and completion rates of IMF 
programs (Bird, 2002; Bird et al., forthcoming; Dreher, 2002; and Joyce, 2001). Using a data set covering 90 
developing countries over the 1980-96 period, Bird et al. (forthcoming) find that “recidivist borrowers” have 
larger current account deficits, lower reserve holdings and smaller capital flows, higher program cancellation 
rates, lower terms of trade and greater debt-service ratios, and are viewed as relatively more corrupt.
35 They 
argue that recidivist countries are caught in a vicious cycle—they enter IMF programs out of necessity when 
balance of payments disequilibria are severe. Adverse external conditions and high poverty appear to make 
the cost of implementing the IMF-sponsored policies high, however, and as a result compliance with program 
conditions are low and a high percentage of the programs are cancelled. The authors argue that if there is no 
penalty for past non-completion, then the country will turn to the IMF again for another program. They 
                                                 
35 They estimate models designed to predict, for a given country, the number of IMF programs and the number of years 
spent in IMF programs.    16 
conclude that non-completion is not a leading indicator of graduating from the Fund but rather one of future 
referrals.
36  
Similarly, Joyce (2001) points out that there is no penalty for non-compliance besides the incomplete 
disbursement of assistance, and a country may enter a new program without penalty. He argues that these are 
the reasons that many countries have agreed to a number of IMF arrangements since the 1970s and spend 
years in a series of consecutive Fund programs. In this context, he investigates the time spent in IMF 
programs (duration) for a group of emerging market economies over 1982-97. He finds that program duration 
has lengthened in recent decades. The average spell length was two and one half years, but the likelihood that 
a spell would end in a given period first rose as time passed and then fell, reflecting the adoption by some 
countries of consecutive programs. Time in programs is extended for those countries with lower per capita 
income, landlocked geographic status, and stable legal processes.
37 He also finds that countries with exports 
concentrated in primary goods are more likely to have longer spells in IMF programs. 
Ivanova et al. (2003) investigate the implementation of IMF-supported programs using measures of 
program interruptions, compliance with conditionality, and the share of committed funds disbursed. Using an 
internal IMF database (MONA) and an econometric model, they find that program implementation depends 
primarily on borrowing countries’ political characteristics. In particular, strong special interests, political 
instability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack of political cohesion, and ethno-linguistic divisions are correlated 
with low implementation rates. By contrast, they do not find any association between initial and external 
conditions and the probability of program implementation.
38 
Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000) uses the same IMF internal database to investigate whether 
transition economies that more successfully implement the conditionality of IMF programs over 1993-97 tend 
to show better performance on recovery and growth. They do not find a clear relationship between the level of 
compliance in meeting “structural benchmarks” of IMF programs and growth, but do find a link between 
growth and the index of success in meeting the “performance criteria” of IMF programs. The authors note that 
the positive and significant relationship between an index of implementation (of the performance criteria) 
does not imply causation since countries that have grown quickly may simply have found it easier to 
implement Fund programs successfully (and consequently meet the fiscal, monetary, credit and other criteria). 
                                                 
36 Knight and Santaella (1997) and Mussa and Savastano (1999) put a more positive light on recidivism. Knight and 
Santaella (1997) suggest that, by entering into repeated fund programs, countries learn how to implement stabilization 
policies. Mussa and Savastano (1999) suggest that recidivism reflects IMF flexibility in dealing with countries over 
time as circumstances change.  
37 Joyce (2001) considers both short- and long-term programs (i.e. SBA, EFF, SAF, ESAF programs), while we consider 
only short-term programs.  
38 Invanova et al. (2003) suggest that this lack of correlation indicates that program targets may incorporate realistic 
goals and be related effectively to a member’s initial position. A member’s initial indebtedness also does not affect the 
outcome of IMF-supported programs.  
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6.  Conclusion: why are IMF-supported stabilizations in Latin America so costly? 
 
The findings of this study and the literature surveyed in the previous section suggest that macroeconomic 
stabilization programs in Latin America—both with and without IMF support—are usually unsuccessful. The 
results are recurring disinflation/stabilization cycles with high output costs. How might these stylised facts be 
related to our work showing both that Latin America has higher output costs of IMF programs (especially 
when “successfully” completed), little or no improvement in the balance of payments, and a much higher 
likelihood of program failure and recidivism than other regions of the world? Indeed, the common finding 
that entering into an IMF-supported program incurs real short-run costs on the economy is entirely driven by 
the bad experiences in Latin America and is not found for the rest of the developing world. 
Most of the stabilization programs in Latin America are linked to IMF programs. 18 of the 22 major 
stabilization programs in Latin America identified by Tornell and Velasco (1998), for example, were started 
around the time IMF programs were approved. The failure of stabilization programs is therefore related to the 
low completion rates of IMF programs. Moreover, if Latin American countries—with a history of failed 
stabilizations—understand that the output costs of a program are likely to be relatively large, it may be that 
continuing in a program would be more vulnerable to a particular external (or internal) disturbance. This 
factor, combined with evidence that Latin America generally faces larger and more frequent external 
disturbances than other parts of the world (Hausmann and Gavin, 1996), could explain the high rates of failure 
of IMF programs.  
Failing to complete a program does not appear to entail especially large costs, and there are no observable 
penalties that prevent entering into a new program soon thereafter (Joyce, 2001). Under these circumstances, 
perhaps it is not surprising that Latin America is caught in a vicious cycle of repeated IMF programs with 
frequent failures and high output costs associated with stabilizations, IMF-sponsored or otherwise. This 
explanation fits well with the model of Rigóbon (2002) in which he directs attention to sequences of failed 
stabilizations in Latin America with subsequent inflation rates higher than before the programs were initiated 
(e.g. Brazil in the 1980s, Venezuela since 1983, Argentina in the 1970s). Rigóbon (2002) demonstrates that 
these sequences may actually be the result of “optimal policy choices” given the incentives faced by 
policymakers. 
This does not necessarily imply that the IMF programs are poorly designed, only that the structural 
features of Latin America combined with external circumstance and a history of failure, makes the vicious 
cycle of failed stabilizations difficult to break. The upshot is that the pattern of recidivist IMF lending and 
repeated program failure in Latin America seems to have little beneficial impact on growth or the balance of 
payments. Adjustment to the balance of payments is related more to recurrent currency crises (sharp exchange 
rate depreciations), i.e. market-driven adjustments to external competitiveness, rather than to IMF programs. 
The output costs associated with IMF-supported stabilization programs in Latin America at times have been   18 
substantial (1970s and 1980s), and greater than in other parts of the world. This may be due to stringent 
conditions imposed on IMF lending or, alternatively, to the lack of policy credibility associated with 
stabilization programs in Latin America.  
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1 - Program Approval  







  SBA  EFF     
         
Full sample  760  57  100  6.8 
Latin America  284  22  11  11.7 
Asia  101  9  13  6.8 
Middle East  33  4  0  5.3 
Africa  229  17  72  7.2 
Other  113  5  4  3.2 
All IMF programs (for all countries) since 1952 which ended by December, 1999 are included. Short 
term programs include Stand-By arrangements, Extended Stand-By arrangements (SBAs) and 
Enhanced Fund Facilities (EFF). Long term programs include Structural Adjustment Facility and 





2 - Program Completion 












Index    a=1  a>0.75  0.25=a=0.75  0.25>a  a=0 
All programs 




317  23%  32%  35%  33%  27% 
All programs 




138  30%  39%  35%  27%  17% 
All IMF programs (for all countries) since 1952 and which ended by December, 1999 are included. The programs include: 
Stand By and Extended Stand By Agreements, Enhanced Fund Facility, Structural Adjustment Facility and Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility. The completion index is the ratio of amount disbursed to amount agreed in any IMF program.    24 
3 - Output Growth Regressions 
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L. American IMF program in the 1990s (t)  3.15** 
(2.51) 
Adjusted R
2  0.46  0.40  0.46  0.40  0.41 
Number of observations  764  594  764  594  594 
Correlation of error terms  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05 
LHS variable: change in real GDP growth. Hausman & Taylor (1981) 3-step IV estimator. T-statistics in parantheses. *, ** and *** 
represent 10, 5 and 1 percent significance respectively. Columns (1)-(5) use the trimmed full sample. 
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4 - Output Growth Regressions – Completion Variables 
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All IMF programs   0.38 
(0.38) 
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2  0.41  0.40  0.40  0.41  0.41 
Number of observations  569  569  569  569  569 
Correlation of error terms  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
LHS variable: change in real GDP growth. Hausman & Taylor (1981) 3-step IV estimator. T-statistics in parantheses. *, ** and *** 
represent 10, 5 and 1 percent significance respectively. Columns (1)-(5) use the trimmed full sample. Column (2)-(3) uses the 
completion index (CI) to identify a binary variable for completed programs. For column (2) CI=1 and for column (3) CI >0.75.  26 
5 - Current Account Regressions 


































































































































2  0.49  0.56  0.56  0.56  0.56 
Number of observations  814  801  801  799  799 
Correlation of error terms  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.07 
LHS: Current account to GDP ratio Hausman & Taylor (1981) 3-step IV estimator. T-statistics in parantheses. *, ** and *** represent 10, 5 and 1 
percent significance respectively. Columns (1)-(5) use the trimmed full sample. Column (4)-(5) use the IMF programs’ completion variables 
described in the text. 
 
 